








QUOTATIONS, DISPLAYS & AUTONOMES
ROGER WERTHEIMER 
2005 Pacific APA Convention Symposium

	Before Frege’s Begriffschrift theorists of logic and language showed no interest in quotation marks. Nor did they use the term, ‘quotation’, like their propter-Fregean successors, for whom “[q]uotation is a device used to refer to typographical or phonetic shapes by exhibiting samples, that is, inscriptions or utterances that have those shapes.”​[1]​ Lexicographers have yet to get wind of this usage. The current OED lists nothing like it. In its commonest colloquial sense, we quote only something someone has said. Quoting is an action performed by a speaker (or utterance or sentence) only by repeating verbal content of a prior utterance. The original may be spoken or written, actual or fictional, repeated verbatim or not, in the same or language or another, by the speaker or another, but the original speech act must be describable in indirect discourse and in other languages.
	Theorists now call any sentence-embedded display of material, like:
	(1) 'Flea' means puce
	(2) Dick's Dodge went 'kehfloo',
a quotation. Better to call them displays. Being a quotation is an historical property, not a semantic or syntactic one. Displays are semantically and syntactically distinctive sentential elements without essential historical relations.
	Many displays are, like (1)-(2), not quotations. Many quotations are not displayed. Direct discourse displays an actual quotation or possible one (something sayable) to refer to it and say something about it, if only that it was (not) or might (not) be said. Such quoting by displaying is common. So too is quoting without displaying. Quoting is repeating speech, not necessarily referring to or displaying speech. We (especially the educated) often echo quote: we use the words of others (who could be ourselves earlier) to say what the words say, and thus to say much the same as the original speaker said with the words. Consider:
	(3) Cosmological arguments involve "an unnecessary shuffle".
I there quote Wittgenstein, and would without the marks. The marks say only this was said before. That message is true, delivered or not. The message doesn't refer to Wittgenstein or any speaker. This punctuational message is outside the propositional message of (3), which says nothing about words. The sense and truth of (3) are independent of the punctuation and the truth of its message. Contrast:
	(3a) Cosmological arguments involve what Wittgensteinians might call "an unnecessary 			shuffle".
Here the marks acquire a second message: this is displayed. They tell us that the material is recruited by the inserted terms of 'what Wittgensteinians might call' so that (3a) refers to the original words and predicates something of them. The imputation of prior utterance enters (3a)'s truth conditions.
	Being a display has semantic import. Being a quotation is semantically inert, and so are marks of the property. For being a quotation, what matters is not the marks but whether the choice of words is explained partly by the original utterance. Coincidental duplications are not quotations. To ask, 'What is truth?', is not, ipso facto, to plagiarize Pilate. Quoting requires some explanatory linkage from quotee to quoter.​[2]​ 
	The common concept of quotation has complexities of philosophical interest apart from any relation to displays, as well as because the literature on displays is rife with confusions of displays with quotations. Confusion is abetted by direct discourse quotations being displays, and by the doubled punctuation message.​[3]​ A simple, sample confusion: some respected theorists privilege linguistic expressions as display material and disparage nonlinguistic display material.​[4]​ Actually, while nonlinguistic material is quotable only as content of a prior utterance, it is perfectly displayable if utterable. Other confusions are more instructive, but we cannot get into any of that now.​[5]​
	All the great interest in quotation marks and displays comes from Frege and the new formal disciplines of metalinguistics and metamathematics. The distinctive sine qua non of the new formal languages is an effective mechanical procedure that forms singular terms which designate any individual expressions we want and algorithmically identify their referents. The obvious choice is to make enquotation a lexical engine yielding a singular term referring to the (kind of) expression enquoted and identifying that referent by exemplifying it. (Other options investigated fail for cumbersomeness.)  Stipulating the device for a formal language might be fruitful. Adopting it for natural language use might be feasible. However, since these formalist enquotations differ semantically and syntactically from natural language displays, we risk insidious, egregious equivocation by using the same notation and nomenclature. So, we'll call these formalist enquotations autonomes, and form them (and them alone) always and only by flanking stars, thusly:
	(1*) *Flea* means puce.
We'll say an autonome of an expression (type) is formed by enstarring (an instance of) it.
	Although so-called theories or analyses of quotation are better called theories or analyses of display, even that risks misleading, since the folks who got philosophers talking about displays (Frege, Tarski, Carnap, Church, Reichenbach, Quine, et alia) were focused on a device fit for formal theories and showed hardly more independent interest in the grammar of natural language displays than pre-Fregeans.​[6]​ Despite various differences, they generally agreed that enquotation (enstarring) generates an endless set of names (or singular descriptions), one for each lexical item in a language, and each of the endless combinations thereof. That's not an implausible conception of autonomes. It can seem, at first glance, to fit displays, until the idea is thought through.
	The deepest objection motivates the demonstrative conceptions of Niels Christensen​[7]​, Donald Davidson (1984) and his followers.​[8]​ Displays are sentence-embedded objects that are functionally fundamentally equivalent to a speech-external replica to which our attention is directed by extrasentential ostension while the same sentence sans display is uttered. (Autonomes have no such analogue. Standard formal languages don't support a comparable appropriation of language/speech-independent objects.)  The semantics of speech acts so appropriating speech-external objects is explained without regarding those objects as names or terms or words (except when they are so independent of their appropriation.) Nothing about their importation into an uttered sentence requires regarding them as acquiring the character of names or terms in the process.
	Demonstrative theories rightly aspire to explain this semantic equivalence. Competing analyses (so-called name theories, picture theories, identity theories, and the rest) have lacked that laudable aspiration. They predicate of displays semantic and syntactic properties inapplicable to speech-external replicas, like termhood, and leave the discrepancy unexplained.
	However, demonstrative theorists conclude that enquoting adds only one term: the marks are a demonstrative indexically pointing through the exemplifying expression to the expression-type exemplified. This too is a plausible account of autonomes – not surprisingly since Davidsonians (though not Christensen) explicitly construct their analyses to meet the demands of truth-conditional semantic theories. Yet, as a conception of natural language displays, this demonstrative analysis is one of those familiar far-fetched philosopher's fantasies whose greatest service is as a reductio of its premises. 
	At bottom, demonstrative theories assume an equivalence between (i) and (ii):
	(i) He said to me, "Go home!"
	(ii) Go home! That's what he said to me.
Actually, standard display punctuation conventions apply much the same to all speech-embedded objects, whether sentenced-embedded or not. Style books all say the proper equivalent of (i) is not (ii), but instead
	(iii) "Go home!" That's what he said to me.
Demonstrative theories about the display in (i) defy the conventions and prohibit the display marks in (iii).They have no account of the display and punctuation of (iii), and thus no real account of their semantically equivalent replicas in (i). 
	The confusion's source is readily spotted. Davidson's explicates D1 as D2:
	D1: 'Alice swooned' is a sentence
	D2: Alice swooned. The expression of which this is a token is a sentence.
That should entail explicating (D3) as the nonsensical (D4):
	D3: The expression, 'Alice swooned', is a sentence 
	D4: Alice swooned. The expression, the expression of which this is a token, is a sentence.
What's gone wrong here? 
	Again, I can state the same fact by voicing (2) (Dick's Dodge went 'kehfloo') or by voicing:
	(2x)​[9]​ Dick's Dodge went
and then producing or pointing at an independently produced sound. But, unlike (2), (2x) is ambiguous. (2x) is a grammatically complete sentence only if the verb is intransitive, unlike the verb of (2). So read, the accompanying sound is semantically irrelevant to (2x)'s content.
	To state the same as (2) by means of a grammatically complete sentence, I need to reformulate (2x) as:
	(2xe)​[10]​ Dick's Dodge made the sound,
and then the same extrasentential factors can function just as with (2x). ​[11]​
	The phrase in (2xe), 'the sound', is a term, a singular description. I probably don't intend it to refer to the sound-event I currently produce or point at (unless I'm playing a recording of the sound Dick's Dodge made (see below).) I and my term refer to the abstract type of sound exemplified by the earlier and current events, or perhaps to the concrete past individual sound-event which the current sound-event replicates. I exploit these language/speech-independent relations by directing my audience's attention to the new sound in order for them to identify the intended extension of my term. I refer, my term refers, and I use the object's natural relation to the referent to represent and identify it. My linguistic purpose is achievable without anyone regarding the object as a term in my utterance. I may "finish" my utterance of (2x) by producing or pointing at an utterance independent object. We don't in fact regard such an object as part of the sentence. We have some reason for that. For starters, we'd get paradoxes of distinct sentence tokens constituted by overlapping parts.
	What I state with (2xe) is what I state with (2x). We have good reason to say that in uttering (2x) I refer to the original sound or its type with a tacit term, 'the sound'. 
That term is the direct object implicit in the meaning of the transitive 'went'. Aside from the way or sense that the term is expressed, the two speech acts are the same.
	What I state with (2xe) I state with:
	(2e) Dick's Dodge made the sound, 'kehfloo'. 
There's no evident reason to think that the sound-token displayed in voicing (2e) is semantically different from its external replica in (2ex). No reason to regard it as a term.
	What I state with (2e) I state with (2). As with (2x), we have reason to say that in uttering (2) I refer to the original sound or its type with an implicit term, 'the sound'. That needn't mean that I somehow said the term in my mind. Nor need it mean that other words, like 'the noise', don't equally well express my implicit term. Whatever reading makes sense of the contextualized speech act will do for an analysis of its structure and its content.
	Call the expression, 'the sound', an ostensionable term, whether explicit or implicit. It's a term whose intended extension is identifiable by ostending or directing attention at a concrete particular object. Lots of expressions are ostensionable terms:  plum, pentagon, pentagonal, Pluto, she, here, and so on. Terms like pedigree, purpose, and pulchritude are not so ostensionable. I'll call a term display-ostensionable if its intended extension is identifiable by ostending or directing attention at an object that is physically incorporable in an utterance. Much that we point at to identify an extension is not readily replicable in a form incorporable into an utterance. Of course, expressions like word, the sentence, John's question are display-ostensionable terms. Any linguistic expression-token is ipso facto a displayable object. Its replicas and type are ipso facto possible referents identifiable by displaying the token in writing or speech. However, the words plum and pentagon are themselves display-ostensionable terms only in writing, not speech, whereas c-sharp is a display-ostensionable term in speech but not writing. Many terms are not readily display-ostensionable in either form. We can point at smells, tastes and feelings, just as well as at sights and sounds, but smells, tastes and feelings are not incorporable into written or voiced speech, so the terms for them are not display-ostensionable. So too for terms like marathon, satin, she, and many others. ​[12]​, ​[13]​
	Demonstrative theories see, as their competition has not, that something other than the displayed object must function as the operative term. Yet, along with their competition, they haven't noticed the undebatable fact that very, very commonly displays appear appositional to an explicit ostensionable term. Expectably, they also haven't noticed that such a term is mandatory, not optionally elided, in correlative grammatically complete utterances appropriating speech-external objects. So, seeing the need for a term in sentences like D1 ('Alice swooned' is a sentence) and (1) ('Flea' means puce), and with no other candidate in plain sight, demonstrative theories tag displays marks with the task of term. Consequently, with an explicit ostensionable term, Davidsonian analysis stutters, as in D4 (the expression, the expression of which this is a token) since, in effect, a (putatively all purpose) ostensionable term is already stuffed into the marks
	Why is it – how could it be – that the common occurrence of ostensionable terms has gone unnoticed? Perhaps it's because formal work and the nonformal work it inspired has fed on a steady diet of sentences lacking and not blatantly needing an explicit ostensionable term, sentences like (D1), (1), and the ubiquitous tokens of  'Boston' has six letters. Perhaps it's also because, not coincidentally, autonomes need no ostensionable term, and, not coincidentally, "speech" in the formal languages of Frege, Tarski, et alia cannot appropriate speech-external objects. Still, the utter absence of any mention of the terms that mention terms is worth mention.
	Another factor must be operative, for it's equally astounding that, despite their familiarity with the gross historical facts of natural language display punctuation, respected theorists attribute essential semantic content or function to display marks. Demonstrative theories are distinctive in making that attribution the cornerstone of display analysis. In competing theories, such attributions are generally excess baggage. For example, name theories of display could as well say that (a) every linguistic expression has (at least) two uses/senses, its normal one and another one as a name of the normal one, and (b) display marks simply disambiguate, signaling that the use/sense as a name is in play. Supposing that the marks somehow explain the display's naming something is superfluous hand waving, and it burdens the theory with the twin implausibilities of demonstrative theories. First, if the marks are to have an essential semantic role, the theories must posit implicit marks when absent – despite the evident utter nonexistence of any display punctuation in human languages till fairly recently, and its use remaining erratic outside formal writing. Moreover, consequently display marks cannot disambiguate, since no expression could be displayed unmarked. Competitors to demonstrative theories are saved only the additional embarrassment of rendering incoherent the marking of speech-embedded displays that are sentence-disembedded, as in (iii).
	There's no evidence that attribution of semantic function to display marks ever did or would pass the giggle test of anyone familiar with the unblinkable empirical data of display punctuation – who was untainted by an understanding (if only via a mentor with an understanding) of the demands of standard formal languages. In those so-called logically perfect languages, each mark and each expression means only what the formation rules assign, and each expression is assigned a single, unequivocal meaning. If, perchance, Church had such languages in mind, he misspoke in saying that by enquoting (=enstarring) “equivocacy is thus removed by providing two different words to correspond to the different meanings.”​[14]​ In such languages, there's no possible equivocation to be removed, for an unenstarred expression can have only the single meaning (and extension, if any) the formation rules assign. Sans stars or some surrogate, such languages cannot systematically refer to their own elements or those of any language.
	Church’s remark betrays a common conflation of autonomes and displays. Formal and informal logic texts insist that displayed expressions in natural languages need to be properly marked to disambiguate their display use (miscalled “mentioning”) from their normal use. The texts exaggerate the need, but they’re right that in natural languages enquotation of displays is disambiguation. It's that and nothing else. 
	Wrapped around some expression, display marks say simply: this material is displayed. Like italics on foreign expressions, the signal is solely epistemic, not semantic. The marks don't enable the expression to be or be read as a display. They can only enforce that reading. They don't thereby preclude also reading the marked expressions per usual, as in (3a) (... call "an unnecessary shuffle"). They don't create a new expression or change the meaning of the sentence. 
	The marks could not disambiguate unless the unmarked expression were already readable as a display. We could never have learned to use display marks – or have imagined there was something to mark – before we already used and understood unmarked displays.​[15]​,​[16]​
	Display marks are only interpretative aids, and generally idle ones outside metalevel talk. Generally, disambiguation is effected by commas or sentence content or speech context, which renders a display reading available or not, likely or not. Metalevel writings raise the risks of misreading with their talk about talk about talk, etc., since (a) similar properties may be predicable of both the extension of the expression when undisplayed and the extension the displayed expression identifies, so sentences may be sensibly interpreted either way, and (b) tracking multiple embeddings gets tricky, as in: ‘““‘This is a sentence’ is a sentence” is a sentence’ is a sentence” is a sentence’. Even there the risk of mistaking a displayed expression for an undisplayed one is remote if the ostensionable term is explicit, rather than elided. Explicitly appositional to such a term, a display can rarely be read as anything else.​[17]​ That reading is made unmistakable in Frege-free writing where enquoting of displays is haphazard, but the display’s appositionality is spotlighted by flanking commas. What seals all this is that even punctilious logicians don't drape quote marks on displays of blatantly nonlinguistic material:
	(4) This particular pentagon, , is black.
 The marks' message is distracting redundance when we reasonably expect our audience to recognize that, if the material is functional and not an accidental smudge, it cannot be functioning as anything but a display.​[18]​
	Again, display marks say simply: this material is displayed. They say nothing like this expression is displayed, for then we could not truly and coherently say: The sound, 'kehfloo' is not an expression. For reasons already given, they don't say: This is a name or some kind of singular term. Nor do they say: This is an adjunct of a singular term, for that would be false in:
	(5) An engine sound, 'kehfloo', is an indicator of bad valves.
	(6)  No (letter) 'i' went undotted, but some (letter) 't''s weren't crossed.
As in (2)-(2e), the displays of (5)-(6) identify the extensions of their ostensionable terms' (engine sound, letter) by exemplifying the extensions. Yet, their ostensionable terms are predicates: they don't refer, and neither do their adjunctive displays.
	Nor do display marks say: this is a replica or instance of the ostensionable term's extension, for that would be false in:
	(7) The proposition, 'Blood is red' is true.
Here the displayed sentence expresses, and doesn't replicate or instantiate, the ostensionable term's referent, the proposition. 
	Nor do display marks say: this is some kind of representational device, for that would be false in (a marked version of) (4) and in:
	(8) This expression-token, 'pentagon', is black.
In (4) and (8), the display is the referent. Like speech-external objects, display objects can be presented to our audience, not as representing something, but simply as the referent designated by our ostensionable term. A referent-display has a dyadic relation to its term. Representative (non-referent)-displays are adjuncts in a triadic relation with the term and its display-distinct extension.​[19]​
	We have little use for referent displays, far less than for appropriating external objects to explain the referents of proper names, demonstratives, and definite descriptions that are not display-ostensionable terms. Still, referent displays make evident that displays need not be anything like a term or representational entity. They also undermine the idea that representative displays are quasi-terms, since representative-display utterances are reformulable as referent-display utterances. The plausibility of paratactic (demonstrative) theories derives from the equivalence of:
	 (1e)  The word 'flea' means puce 	
	 (1R) The word exemplified by this, ‘flea’, means puce.
More generally, the sentence schemata, The T, ‘…’, is F, is ambiguous. The display could be replicative (The T replicated by this, ‘…’, is F), instantiative (The T exemplified by this, ‘…’, is F), or expressive (The T expressed by this, ‘…’, is F) as well as a referent (The T that is this, ‘…’, is F). The basic form of predicative displays, x is a T, ‘…’, is equivalent to the referent display: x is a T exemplified by this, ‘…’.  So, (triadic) representative display sentences are reducible to (dyadic) referent displays sentences, which are equivalent to display-exported sentences uttered with direct ostension of the term's referent, where the object ostended has no representational role.​[20]​
 	Displays are not unique in being sentential elements identifying and representing an extension and determining truth conditions without predicating or denoting anything. Any word may operate in an apparent term position, as apparent direct object of a semantic verb or a term in a semantic identity, as in:
	(11) The word ‘hence’ may mean thus
	(12) The meaning of the German word, ‘der’, is the.
Here the words, thus, and, the, are not expressive displays, but like them, for they identify a referent meaning by expressing it, not by designating or describing it.​[21]​
	Contrary to prior analyses of displays, displays are not referential or predicational. Also contrary to prior analyses, displays are not objects of reference (referents) or predication.​[22]​ Referent displays are the exception, but they are referred to only by their ostensionable term; otherwise, like representative displays, they aren’t referred to – no more than any other sentential element is. Certainly, we may say that display marks refer to the display marked – just as quote marks refer to the quotation enquoted, and italics refer to the foreign expression italicized – but such punctuational "references" are not semantic constituents; they don't register in a sentence's semantic content or truth conditions.
	The idea that representative displays are referred to may derive from our commonly pointing at their speech-external equivalents. The finger pointing paradigm is misleading. Suffice that sentence-external factors entitle the speaker to expect his audience to direct its attention to the intended object to identify the ostensible term's extension. No finger or pointing or any activity by the speaker is necessary, for other contextual factors may do the job. Still, the speaker does in some sense refer to the object since its very utterance-independence makes this necessary for linguistic appropriation. That need disappears with sentence-embedding.
	A display is linguistically appropriated without reference to it. This has truth conditional import. With representative displays, sentence-incorporation entails that, per usual, sentence replication secures sameness of statement. With appropriated external objects, statement sameness is subject to the contingencies of ostending the appropriate external object. (Replications of referent-display sentences make truth functionally equivalent but distinct statements about distinct referents. 
	A display is incorporated grammatically, without reference to it, by appropriate positioning. Displays generally must adjoin their ostensionable term. In English, a display standardly succeeds its term, but representational displays often can precede their ostensionable term:
	(2^)  Dick's Dodge made the ‘kehfloo’ sound 	
	(6^)  No ‘i’ letter went undotted, but some ‘t’ letters went uncrossed
	(7^)  The ‘Blood is red’ proposition is true.
Other display positions render the sentence gibberish. In contrast, only pragmatics, not syntax, constrains the location of appropriated extrasentential objects.
	The syntactic incorporation of displays appears in their being ineliminable elements in sentences true by syntax alone. Consider:
	(2e)(2ex): If Dick's Dodge made the sound ‘kehfloo’, then Dick's Dodge made the sound
			(+ gesturing at an external ‘kehfloo’ sound.)
Sentences (2e) and (2ex) differ formally, so sentence (2e)(2ex) is form pq, not a logical truth like (2e)(2e). 
	The logical import of display grammar is on display in the pivotal role displays play in statements of basic semantic principles: 
	DM1: Expression, ‘E1’, means (says, denotes, connotes) E1
	DM2: Expression, 'E1', means (says, denotes, connotes) E2 ≡ expression, 'E2', means E1
	DM3: Expression, 'E1', means (= names, refers to) E2 ≡ E1 = E2​[23]​ 
	DT:    Statement (proposition or sentence) ‘S’ is true  S  that S is true.
These principles have often been misconceived, commonly due to misconceptions about displays.
	Consider now the positing of an implicit ostensionable term where none is explicit. Skepticism about unspoken sentential elements needn't be unreasonable, since conjuring evidence of grammatical gremlins toiling far beneath surface sentential appearances is all too easy, and any proof is hostage to recalcitrant delusions of intuition.​[24]​ We needn't be distracted by ontological worries about ellipsis, for none are peculiar to this case and the onus on a display analysis doesn't depend on the "reality" of the posited term. 
	Most display analyses are compatible with explicit ostensionable terms, and with recognizing implicit ones, so they have no reason to refuse such recognition. At most they might balk from supposing that recognizing implicit terms here is unmotivated and otiose, but our analysis thus far has already amply motivated the posit.​[25]​ Only demonstrative theories are centrally incompatible with displays being term adjuncts, and thus with positing implicit ostensionable terms. Such theories can hardly complain about the posit here, since (a) they are incompatible even with the plentiful explicit ostensionable terms, and (b) this posit of implicit terms is motivated by much the same considerations motivating the demonstrative theories' far more fantastic posit of implicit display marks. Moreover, while their posit has the implausible consequences we've discussed, positing implicit terms here has none. It is, at worst, only somewhat awkward to read:
	(N) Her name is 'Nana'
as something like:
	(Ne) Her name is the name 'Nana' (or perhaps: The name 'Nana' is hers.)
However awkward such readings may be, they're hardly embarrassments.
	Meanwhile, competing analyses cannot complain since they have no evident means of explaining various matters naturally explained by the adjunctive analysis. For starters, they are all focused on representative displays adjunctive to a singular term, so they all take displays (or their marks or the combination) to be singular terms. They don't confront and cannot (without ad hocery) account for either referent displays or representative displays adjunctive to predicative ostensionable terms. On competing accounts such displays should be ungrammatical (or else an unrelated linguistic phenomenon.)​[26]​ 
	Every display analysis permits displays to represent some class of referents. Many analyses admit only a narrow range of referents such as types the display tokens. Some analyses claim themselves capable of allowing a great range of kinds referents: tokens, types, and classes of all kinds, as well as meanings, and so on. Their explanation of how the kind of referent is determined is hardly more than hand waving. Ultimately these liberal analyses leave it all to the speaker's intention. Left unacknowledged in such analyses is that the speaker's intention is specifiable only by means of a display-ostensionable term. Also unexplained and unacknowledged is that the range of possible kinds of referents is limited to the extensions of display-ostensionable terms. In sum not only must these liberal analyses admit the possibility of implicit ostensionable terms, they tacitly demand them. On the other hand, demonstrative theories could be relieved of their unwelcome restrictiveness by letting their demonstrative display marks include a variable ostensionable term instead of turning a term like 'expression' or 'shape' into a dummy noun.​[27]​
	The philosophical fruits of the adjunctive analysis cannot be harvested here. I can only sketch one example. Quine called displays “the referentially opaque context par excellence.”​[28]​ Why, he never explained. Actually, their alleged opacity is anything but paradigmatic. Elsewhere, referential opacity is a semantic reflection of metaphysical facts: e.g., modal contexts are opaque because actual coextension need not be necessary coextension. In contrast, the substitutability of coextensive terms in displays is explained by their grammar, not by some independent metaphysical datum. 
	The referential opacity of modal and attitudinal contexts indicates the dependence there of a sentence’s truth conditions on a term’s extra-extensional semantic import, not (or not just) on the term's extension. In every such context, every term is referentially opaque. In contrast, substituting semantic equivalents for displayed expressions needn't transmit truth when and because the expression’s semantic import is irrelevant to the sentence’s truth conditions, as in: 
	(20) ‘Greece’ is monosyllabic
	(21) ‘Greece’ contains a letter ‘e’,
Substituting coextensive ‘Hellas’ for ‘Greece’ trades truth for falsehood in (20) but not (21); either way, term meaning is irrelevant. But when a semantic property is predicated of a displayed expression sentence truth is unaffected by subbing another expression having that property, as in:
	(22) The statement, ‘Blood is red’, is true​[29]​
	(23) The name, ‘Greece’, means (= refers to, denotes) Hellas.
Naturally, coextension of 'E1', 'E2', and 'E3' does not suffice to validate their intersubstituting in 'E1' means (= says, connotes) E2; however, their synonymy does entail such substitutability.
	The truth is that the Fregean test of referential occurrence is inapplicable to displays just as it is to extrasentential objects. What explains the intersubstitutability in (22)-(23) is that, tautologically, claims about a semantic property of an expression – displayed or undisplayed – are equally true of any expression with that semantic property. 
	Quine thought that displaying “can (and ordinarily does) destroy referential occurrence”, but semantic predications are “exceptional”.  His explanation of these exceptions was that such “special predicates … have the effect of undoing the single quotes.”​[30]​ This explanation is allegedly evidenced by the equivalence of pairs like:
	(22) (The statement) 'Blood is red' is true	  (24) Blood is red
	(23) (The name) 'Greece' means Hellas	               (25) Greece is Hellas.











^1	 Donald Davidson, “Quotation”, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 1984, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
^2	 We can identify a randomly generated replica as a quotation, but the randomizer is not quoting, but not from lack of knowledge. Human quoters can be ignorant of the historical linkage. People commonly use sayings unaware of their having an author. We ask them, “Did you know that that's a quotation from Mencken?” or “Did you know that you were quoting Mencken?”  To properly reply, “He may have said it first, but I wasn't quoting him”, you may need some reason to suppose that Mencken’s utterance had nothing to do with your using those very words. Some may insist that the speaker’s ignorance precludes her quoting words which are, nonetheless, a quotation. Nothing here hangs on this.	Intentionality of repetition is neither essential nor enough. Reciting is not quoting. I quote Mencken, not Veblen, when I quote Mencken quoting Veblen. Quoting is, we might say, personally voiced speech where the speaker uses another’s words in her own voice. We may quote lyrics, but not while singing the song. We may quote lines from a play, pledge or prayer, but not while play acting, pledging or praying.  Not even if the lyrics or lines are quotes. The words must be meant. Yet sincerity doesn’t suffice for quoting. When reciting the Lord’s Prayer fervently, meaning every word of it, a supplicant does not quote it, as she would by echoing its lines amidst prayers or essays she authors.	The folk concept of quotation does not answer to any formal linguistic theory. The category is contoured by our diverse interests in the diverse uses we make of each other’s words. Assigning responsibility for words used has various kinds of importance. Consider the great range of reasons for saying: Don’t quote me on this. This is a distinct, derivative sense of ‘quote’: to attribute words to someone. Both senses normally apply to direct discourse quoting, whereas only the primary sense normally applies to echo quoting.
^3	  Confusion is compounded by the ambiguity of the term 'quotation marks', which gets used to refer to (1) a punctuation form, single or double flanking apostrophes, with diverse functions (marking titles, displays, etc.), (2) a punctuation function, indicating a quotation, performed by diverse forms (italics, colons, spacing, etc.), or (3) some combination of (1) and (2): a punctuation form, whatever its instant function, which sometimes functions to mark quotations. Hereafter, I stick with less ambiguous terms, like 'display marks', and 'marks of quotation', except when the ambiguity of 'quotation marks' is intended, as in the opening sentence of the next paragraph of the text. 
^4	 For example, Peter Geach (Mental Acts, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957) and Jonathan Bennett ("Quotation", Nous (1988) 22, pp. 399-418.) Paul Saka rightly rejects the restriction, but not compellingly, for he does not locate it in a confusion of displays with quotations ("Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction", Mind (1998) 107, pp. 114-135.)
^5	  One example is the analysis of scare quotes, discussed briefly below. Another nest of issues concerning the proprieties of translation and replication of quotations and displays – subjects of numerous, persisting controversies. (See Nathan Salmon, "The Very Possibility of Language" (M. Zeleny and C. A. Anderson, eds., Logic, Meaning and Computation, Synthese Library, 2002) for a contentious review of the literature on Alonzo Church's translation test.) Briefly, the criteria here are, perforce, more pragmatic than formal, especially regarding quotation. Acceptability of a quotation or display-replication is situationally variable, depending largely on speaker and/or audience interests and purposes. Since our interests and purposes regarding quotations are distinct from those regarding displays, the criteria for acceptable replication can diverge.
^6	  Despite Tarski's claiming that his account of displays as names "seems to be the most natural one and completely in accordance with the customary way of using quotation marks" ("The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" (1933) (tr. J. Woodger) in his Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics, Oxford, 1956), nothing in his corpus suggests that this alleged appearance came from a more than cursory glance at the linguistic phenomena. 
^7	 "The Alleged Distinction between Use and Mention", Philosophical Review, (1967) 76, pp. 358-67. Although Christensen well preceded Davidson, his essay has not been near as influential as Davidson's, so I shall refer more to the latter.
^8	  See Ernie Lepore and Herman Cappelen, “Varieties of Quotation”, Mind, 1997, 106: 429-50, and “On an Alleged Connection between Semantic Theory and Indirect Quotation”, Mind and Language, 1997, 12: 278-96, and Ernie Lepore, “The Scope and Limits of Quotation”, in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Lewis E. Hahn, ed., (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale) 1999, 691-714, and Davidson's “Reply to Ernie Lepore”, Ibid, 715-17.
^9	  The 'x' of  '(2x)' indicates that the utterance is the equivalent correlative of (2) used with an exported,  speech-external  object
^10	  The 'e' of  '(2xe)' indicates that the utterance has the explicit term implicit in the the correlative equivalent, (2x). 
^11	  Christensen's (1967) observed that, standing before a Studebaker, one might simply say 'A Studebaker' rather than 'This is a Studebaker'. The former utterance is properly said to make the same statement as the latter. However it is not usefully regarded as the utterance of an elliptical sentence. (I may make lots of statements (assertions, claims) by checking the boxes next to names of medical conditions on a medical history report form. Theories of grammar are not well-advised to analyze this as utterings of elliptical sentences.) The point is, as Saka (1988) rightly notes, 'Is a Studebaker' is not accepted as an elliptical sentence.
^12	  I speak of terms being readily or not readily ostensionable or display-ostensionable, rather than absolutely so, because (display-) ostensionability is a matter of degree, depending on factors like observability, existing conventions, and the speaker's ingenuity and mimetic talents. For example, 'Venus' (the planet-name) is a more readily ostensionable term than 'Pluto' since its referent is more visible in the night sky. They are equally ostensionable with astronomical pictures. Neither term is readily display-ostensionable, but one could sentence-embed a schematic of our solar system with the second or ninth planet highlighted.
^13	 The sound 'kehfloo' might happen to be a term, perhaps among some Navajo or Norsemen, but that's irrelevant. More instructive, and somewhat more relevant, the sound could become a term. I might speak of Dick's 'kehfloo' Dodge. These latter flanking marks are not display marks, but scare quotes appropriate for coinages, slang, and the like. The meaning of the new adjective, kehfloo, is explained by use of the display: maker of the sound 'kehfloo'. 	Still more relevant, sometimes we can identify a term’s extension with a sentence-incorporable visual or auditory representation of a replica or example of the extension. A schematic picture of a tulip may be a display adjunctive to the terms 'tulip' or 'flower'. It identifies the term's extension by symbolizing it. Icon tokens can be regarded like names and other terms, as representing a referent, standing for it and referring to it, apart from a speaker's intention. Displays of words represent their replicas or type by replicating or exemplifying them, not by symbolizing them. Iconic displays are exceptional, and my exposition is simplified by putting them aside. Besides, the basic point remains: even iconic displays are not terms.
^14	  Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Princeton, 1956, p 62. 
^15	  Arguably, we could never acquire a first language if we could not use unmarked displays, for arguably we could not acquire a first language if sentences like 'This is red' were not naturally readable both objectually (This has the property of being red) and metalinguistically (This is called 'red'.) We must learn how to call things by their (proper or common) names before we can understand explicit metalinguistic expressions like: This is called 'red'.
^16	 From early till late, Quine's primary commitment was never to a specific display theory but only to stressing the crucial function of quotation marks as disambiguators. Only his formal work could explain his being given to preposterous declarations like: "It would be not merely untrue but ungrammatical and meaningless to write: Dreary rimes with weary" (Methods of Logic, New York, Henry Holt, 1959, 38.) What empirical evidence could a radical translator (or anyone) suggest to support such a claim of untruth, ungrammaticality and/or meaninglessness? Would even Quine (outside discussions about displays) really voice the sentence: "Quote dreary end quote rimes with quote weary end quote?" Could it really be that displays are never uttered or at all formulable in languages utterly lacking anything like the punctuation peculiar to modern written languages?
^17	  The only exception in English I have thought of is that of an appositional expression that could be a display or instead be a term addressing the audience, as in: The name, Bob, is short. Direct vs. indirect discourse ambiguity in English is no exception if the that-complementizer of indirect discourse is elidable after the speech verb in (a) Ted stated he was late but not after the speech noun in (b) Ted made the statement he was late.  
^18	  Idle enquotation is distracting and risks confusion. Consider: the external quotation marks in 	Ed couldn’t decipher the tablet's inscription, ‘)(*/}#^#”’.Are those marks display punctuation or display parts?
^19	  It's worth observing that while the primary motivation for ostending objects and uttering displays is to supplement an ostensionable term’s otherwise indeterminate specification of the speaker’s intended extension, other motives may operate instead. Ostensionable terms may also be proper names of concrete individuals or names of abstract objects needing no supplemental specifiers:	(9) He was cheered by singing ‘Side By Side’, “Oh, we aint got a barrel of money …” 	(10) A geometrical square, □, is an equilateral rectangle.Although perhaps informative, illustrative displays as in (9)-(10) are truth-functionally redundant, unlike other displays.
^20	  It is tempting, and perhaps profitable, to hypothesize that there is a conceptual and perhaps psychological order of representational complexity here, beginning with the primitive dyadic term-referent relation,  then the most primitive triadic relation of term-replica-referent, then the implicitly tetradic relation of term-display-property-extension, where abstract concepts enter, and then the pentadic relation of expression: term-display symbol-referent, where the display represents a representational relation. 
^21	  Some theorists put display marks on thus and the in (11) and (12). This is confused and confusing. The words are not displayed. Prefacing those words with ostensionable terms produces an absurdity. 	(11') The word ‘hence’ may mean the word 'thus'	(12') The meaning of the German word, ‘der’, is the word 'the'.Other theorists prefer (11") and (12"):	(11") The word, ‘hence’, may mean the same as the word, ‘thus’	(12") The meaning of the German word, ‘der’, is the meaning of the English word, ‘the’.While (11)/(11") and (12)/(12") might be pairs of equivalents, they are not pairs of synonyms. This is one more instance of the utility of an analysis of displays as term adjuncts.
^22	  More fully, neither displays nor their marks nor the combination are referential or predicational or objects of reference or predication.
^23	  DM3 may be taken as an instance of the more general DM4: 	Expression, 'E1', means (= denotes) E2 ≡ (E1 = E2  v (x)(E1x  ≡  E2x)) .
^24	  For example, elsewhere I argue that identity sentences (form a=b) have a peculiar, nonpredicative syntax. (See my "Identity: Logic, Ontology, Epistemology," in Philosophy, April, 1998  (73), 179-93, and "Identity Syntax," Tom Rockmore, ed., Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol II: Metaphysics, Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999, 171-86) A supporting datum, not suggested there, is that identity sentences are peculiarly resistant to ostensionable term elision. To my mind, the ungrammaticality of identities between bare displays is transparent.Consider:	(i) And is and	(ii) 'And' is 'and'.Unless (i) and (ii) are read as ellipses for:	(iii) The word 'and' is the word 'and',they are (at best) on a par with pointing at some object, saying ‘is’, then pointing at the object again. Yet, while everyone sees (i) is no sentence, some presumptively competent speakers say they sense nothing wrong with (ii), and they insist they're not reading it as (iii). They should yield after considering:	(iv)  is  	(v)  '' is  '' 	(vi) The design, , is the design,  ,since display marks on the blatantly nonlinguistic material of (v) are nonstandard: optional, if not counter-conventional. Still, the issue may not admit of truly rigorous proof. The sole certainty is that it won't be settled by introspection or intuition.	Ultimately, the issue is murky. Is there some interesting sense in which an unspoken word is actually present? Do we known a useable specification of the sense, or way, or respect in which an uttered word, or more abstractly a term, is there, really there, in the act or product of utterance – there because it must be there whether perceived or not? 
^25	 Peripheral theses of some display analyses may be threatened by recognizing the need for implicit ostensionable terms. For example, Recanti's (2001) analysis of "mixed quotations" (where an expression functions as both indirect discourse and a direct discourse quotation) appears to demand the absence of an ostensionable term designating the internal object of speech verbs.
^26	   This claim may seem surprising in light of the prevalence of so-called identity theories of display. Perhaps I misunderstand such theories, but I cannot take seriously the suggestion that the displayed referent pentagon in (4) refers to itself (or anything else.) If it does, then every referent is a referring expression. It is not inaccurate to say that the referent in such cases is used to identify itself (i.e., to bring the audience's attention to it.)  It is inaccurate to say that the referent is therein some kind of sign or representation of itself.   
^27	 The explanatory scope and utility of our adjunctive analysis of displays is wide-ranging. Consider, scare quotes for jargon, slang, irony, and the like. Early display analyses rightly dismissed them as irrelevant to the subject of displays. More recent analyses sometimes discuss scare quotes extensively, betraying in the process a confusion of displays with quotations. (For example, Recanti (2001), Paul Saka, "Quotation Matters", forthcoming.) Actually, scare quotes are a derivative use of marks of quotation. Prior accounts of them suffer from failing to notice that scare quotes differ categorically from display marks, since scare quoted material does not need – indeed, it rarely allows – insertion of an ostensionable term. Instead of the utterance, 'Your "little darling" tortured my cat', one might say 'Your so-called "little darling" (or: 'Your "little darling", as you like to call her) tortured my cat', but no ostensionable term (e.g., 'term of endearment') is insertable. 	  Recognizing the need for display ostensionable terms can motivate insights into various matters. Specifically, in direct discourse the direct object of the speech verb is not the display but rather the speech product (illocution) that is the internal object of the speech verb. To assert (apologize, promise) is to make an assertion (apology, promise.) The implicit object of generic speech verbs like 'say' varies with the sentence content and speech context. This facilitates contrasting direct and indirect discourse.
^28	  W.V.O. Quine, “Grades of Modal Involvement,” in The Ways of Paradox, Random House, NY, 1966, 159.  
^29	  I use ‘statement’ where the claim applies alike to sentences and the propositions they express. 
^30	  “Reference and Modality” in From a Logical Point of View, (Harper, NY) 1961, 141.
^31	  The semantic word can’t enforce a reading on its own unless it is unambiguous. The sentence, Greece names Hellas, is ambiguous since naming can be a term-referent relation or a speech act performed by an agent (here, the nation.) The sentence, The Morning Star names the Evening Star, resists the latter reading.
